(c) 2002,2008 Peter McCollum
Training, Tradecraft, and
Technology
Training
The CIA has operated training facilities in various places
around the world, for various purposes. Some facilities were permanent, others
were temporary, to support a particular operation. A facility would typically
involve personnel from the Agency’s Office of Training (OTR), and might also
include experts from other departments, such as commo, paramilitary, security,
etc. Trainees could be foreigners that had been recruited for an operation, or
other Agency personnel, or various military/paramilitary personnel. OTR
operated similar to a university, and at least some Agency employees were
allowed to attend classes in their spare time, even if the material was not
directly related to their work.
An example of a cold-war training base was on Saipan, in the
Mariana Islands. Because of it’s location, the site was used to train personnel
related to operations in Southeast Asia [ref 25, page 110]. Another training
site was known as “The Farm”, at Camp Peary, Virginia [ref 17, page 292; ref
25, page 110].
A document describing a
“survey” course involving short-range communication devices. The instructor was
from the CIA’s Technical Services Division (TSD); the student was from the
Office of Training (OTR).
During WWII, the primary training facility for radio operators
was known as “Area C”, which is currently part of the Prince William Forest
Park, near Triangle, Virginia. There were several other sites in the Washington
area, and Catalina Island near Los Angeles was used late in the war for commo
training.
Morse code training for OSS
radio operators at Area C, in a building today known as “Camp #4 Craft Shop”,
built by the Civilian Conservation Corps in 1939. Image courtesy of Prince
William Forest Park / National Archives.
Target practice at Area C.
Image courtesy of Prince William Forest Park / National Archives.
Tradecraft
RS-1 Use in Operation
PBSUCCESS
Transcribed here are excerpts from documents related to
operation ‘PBSUCCESS’, which involved the overthrow of the Guatemalan dictator
in 1954.
Operational Contact Report 18,
17-Feb-1954, excerpts from a meeting to discuss plans for the upcoming
operation:
Re PP – main discussion
centered on targets, media to be used, personnel to be used both here and there
and the problem of the radio. Station site has been promised in [ ] there, a
general who is a friend of RUFUS. [ ] suggested that they go to [ ] and discuss
putting the radio on an isolated hacienda – he thought that they could put it
in effect 30 days prior to the effective date but that would not prove to be
effective.
Subject of communications
and R/Os was brought up. The first requirement laid on for fulfillment on his
return was to acquire 20 R/Os and have them moved to Nicaragua. We have 6 now
who have experience. RS-1 will require training period of 2 - 2½ months for men
with experience.
Notes:
·
“PBSUCCESS” is a code name
for this part of the operation. This type of code name is normally written in
all caps, and the first 2 letters are intended to be unpronounceable in
English.
·
Phrases shown as [ ] were
deleted before public release.
·
“R/O” is radio operator.
Suggestions for Specific Operational Plan for [ ],
12-May-1954, excerpts from a plan describing details related to the
communications network:
Section I: Mission
A. Definition of agent’s mission:
Agent’s mission is to furnish a clandestine radio link in communications
between SEMANTIC in Guatemala City and project headquarters, LINCOLN, and then
to the Field Command Post for the period 5 May to D + 30.
B. Time table and implementation of
mission.
1.
23 – 30 April
a. Agent will receive final week’s commo
instruction a SCRANTON. Instruction will concentrate on starage battery and
internal crypto procedures and use of specific radio signal plan. MIDDLECOTT
will arrive a SCRANTON on or about 1 May and give agent his final commo
check-out.
b. Agent will be given LCFLUTTER
examination prior to his departure from SCRANTON.
c. SHERWOOD will set up and prepare
radio signal plan for agent’s use; will pass plan to [ ] for pouching to Guat
and subsequent passing via ESCABILLA and SEMANTIC to agent.
d. Headquarters will pouch two RS-1’s
and supplementary gear to Guat via LINCOLN for subsequent passing via ESCABILLA
and SEMANTIC to agent.
3. 7 May
a. Briefed and equipped as per travel
plan of para one above, agent will be turned over to the CALLIGERIS mechanism
for black entry and establishment in agent’s own home in Guatemala City. Prior
to shedding his escort, the agent must have a secure contact plan via cutout
with SEMANTIC.
4. D – 27 to D – 2
a. Upon arrival, the agent will survey
his home surroundings and settle himself in the securest possible arrangement
for “black” living. He should prepare separate places of concealment for his
RS-1 and for his signal plan materials and should select a suitably secure
antenna site. He should recruit a lookout, preferably a member of his own
family, to keep watch and warn him in case he is interrupted while operating
his equipment.
b. When the agent is fully prepared on
the above matters, he should implement his contact plan with his cutout to
SEMANTIC and proceed to obtain and install his equipment, which will include
his RS-1 plus supplementary gear, radio signal plan and materials, one or more
six-volt storage batteries, and survival kit.
d. Once contact has been established,
Project Headquarters will direct agent to proceed to service traffic between
SEMANTIC and the Project Headquarters (and FCP). He must abide by radio
discipline at all times and will keep himself as sterile as possible.
5. D – 2
a. On D – 2, Project Headquarters will
communicate a special indicator to agent which will be passed by agent to
SEMANTIC without delay. Agent will not be witting of the meaning of this
indicator.
6. D – Day
a. On D-day, agent will be notified by
SEMANTIC cease operation and remain black for thirty days.
Section III: Communications
A. GENERAL
1.
In general, agent will be equipped with:
a. a three-way commo plan
allowing for regular, alternate and emergency channels of communication between
himself and the net. In view of the basic limitations of agent material,
agent’s limited trade-craft training, and of the fact that agent must deal with
other totally untrained persons, it is apparent that the simplest possible
contact plans and rigid compartmentation must be used and adhered to if security
is to be attained. It should constantly be born in mind that agent is witting
of the content of the messages he is passing, an undesirable but unavoidable
fact in the case.
b. a means of receiving
special couriers.
c. his radio channel.
The following examples illustrate the
exceedingly simple commo plans desired:
B. REGULAR (PERSONAL CONTACT)
1. Agent’s regular channel
of communications will be his cutout. The agent should recruit the most trusted
member of his family to act as cutout and should train the cutout in the
principles of making personal contacts and preserving operational and personal security. A cutout must be used
because agent is living “black” and thus has little or no freedom of movement.
Similarly, the net leader, being a prominent oppositionist, must also choose a
cutout. Moreover, the radio cutout must be given more protection than the net
cutout in formulating contact plans since the radio agent is relatively
irreplaceable. Cutouts should deal with each other on a strict need-to-know basis,
and any written material passed between the two should contain no operational
details of the net.
Notes:
·
“SEMANTIC” is possibly the
code name for the CIA Station Chief in Guatemala City.
·
“D” refers to a “D-day” when
the coup would be initiated.
·
“LCFLUTTER” is a polygraph
(‘lie detector’) test.
·
A “cutout” is a contact
person between an agent and his handler or another agent. The cutout is told as
little as possible about the nature of the messages that he delivers, and the
identities of the persons involved.
·
Living “black” refers to
staying out of sight, with as few contacts with people as possible.
·
The “special indicator”
could be a code word/phrase, or it could be an object that the recipient will
recognize.
Signal Plan Example
Following are images of an OSS agent’s signal plan, from mission
LEPIDUS in Austria. The actual document is two plastic-coated cards, about 2 by
3 inches, printed on both sides (the 4th side is missing).
Technology
Following are some thoughts related to radio transmission modes,
and how the technology has been used over time. Some of the viewpoints were
related to me by a CIA commo veteran.
1) In the 40's, CW was used because it was simple in the
hardware, easy to copy over long distances, etc. More sophisticated modes did
not exist yet in a form that was practical for clandestine work. CW was proven
technology, it was reliable, it was difficult to jam, and message accuracy was
easier to maintain. Using brevity
code messages a lot of information could be transmitted in a short period of
time.
2) When FM and SSB became practical for portable radios, it was
not desirable for clandestine agent use because over long paths radio
reliability was still missing, the circuitry was more complex and therefore
more complicated to repair and maintain, it was easy to jam, and voice
recognition could be a security issue (Rather than send the letter R, you would
have to increase transmission time by using Romeo, etc.). However, short-range
FM equipment was used occasionally in urban environments, and also in many
surveillance and training situations. For example, most early surveillance
transmitters were low-power VHF FM, and the CIA’s Office of Training used early
Motorola Handie-Talkies in training exercises in the Washington D.C. area.
3) To help achieve higher security in communications, one
approach was to use burst-transmission of common Morse codes. This did not
require any changes to the well-used cipher systems. Practical, portable
burst-transmission hardware was available in the early 60's. Some burst-transmission gear was
available earlier, but the pre-1960’s technology was strictly mechanical, using
photo film or paper tape as the medium.
4) In fixed installations, RTTY was used beginning in the 50's.
It was a more efficient way to send larger volumes of data, but RTTY was never
a clandestine broadcast method - the field end took a lot of equipment and a
lot of maintenance. However, RTTY was ideal for ‘staff work’, such as routine
communications with embassies.
5) Other than for surveillance or training activities, voice
transmission was generally only used in situations where ‘civilians’ with
limited training would be using the equipment. Examples are the “Village
Radios”, and the Delco 5300, both used in Vietnam (see those sections for more
info).
6) Eventually, voice-scrambling became practical in portable
equipment, in about the late 1970's. But, burst-transmission of CW signals was
still more practical in most cases. Scrambler hardware was expensive, and too
easily compromised. Early spread-spectrum would have had similar disadvantages.
7) FM and SSB saw limited clandestine use; primarily in
connection with military and para-military operations, where comms were needed
with standard military equipment and personnel.